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AVIATION LAW: ATTEMPTS TO CIRCUMVENT THE
LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY IMPOSED ON
INJURED PASSENGERS BY THE WARSAW
CONVENTION
It is generally recognized, both in the legal community and in the
public sector, that the amount of recoveries in personal injury and
wrongful death actions has been rising. In one area of aviation law,
however, this trend has been conspicuously absent. The Warsaw Convention' places an absolute limit on the amount of recoveries for injuries or death incurred while the plaintiff was a passenger on an
international flight.
As might be expected, the treaty has born the brunt of both frontal
and flanking attacks by ingenious plaintiffs' attorneys. The Warsaw
Convention stands today as a brick wall in the path of increasing recoveries for injuries and deaths. This article will focus on the many attempts to avoid the limitation of liability afforded airlines by the
Warsaw Convention and will analyze why they have failed. It will
also discuss whether any nonpolitical attempt to alter the limits will be
successful.2
THE TREATY

The Warsaw Convention was enacted in 1929. 3 Its purpose was to
limit potential liability for aviation accidents in order to promote the
rapid growth of international air travel.4 It was felt by the delegates
that a low limit of liability would enable the airline industry to grow
without the burden of large lawsuits or equally large insurance premiums.5 The Warsaw Convention limits airline liability for passengers'
injuries or death to approximately $8,300.6 In order to justify this
!. The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, T.S. No. 876, 49 Stat. 3000 (1934) [hereinafter referred to in text and
footnotes as the Warsaw Convention or the Convention].
2. A broad overview of this area will be presented to the reader in this article. For an indepth analysis of specific problems, citations will be given to detailed sources.
3.

1 L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW § 11.01[2] (rev. ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as

KREINDLER].

4. Id.
5. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 497, 499-500 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn].
6. The actual amount of recovery is limited by article 22(1) to 125,000 Poincar6 francs,
which was equivalent to $8,292 at the time of the signing of the convention. KREINDLER, supra
note 3, at § 12.02[1].
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rather low limitation of liability, the Warsaw Convention also created a
presumption of liability against the airlines.7 This presumption can be
overcome in only three circumstances: if the carrier has taken all possible measures to prevent, or if it was impossible to prevent the accident; 8

if the passenger was contributorily negligent;9 or if the carrier was
guilty of "wilful misconduct."'" The Warsaw Convention also imposed
a two-year statute of limitations on any action brought under its
terms. 1
The United States became a signatory of the Convention on October 29, 1934.12 The Warsaw Convention supersedes domestic law in
this area by virtue of its being a treaty of the United States.' 3
The Warsaw Convention has been ratified by ninety-eight countries.14 These member nations have met three times since the Convention's adoption to modify and update it. The first such meeting was
held at The Hague in September, 1955.'1 As a result of this meeting, the

Hague Protocol was signed,' 6 and has been ratified by forty-four na-

tions. 17 The major fault the delegates found in the Warsaw Convention
was its low limitation of liability. As a result of this belief, the Hague
Protocol embodies a rise in the liability limit to approximately
$16,60018 and a clarification of the term "wilful misconduct" as used in
article 25.19 The Hague Protocol substitutes "an act or omission...
done with intent to cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge
7. KREINDLER, supranote 3, at § 11.02.
8. Article 20(1) of the Warsaw Convention, supranote 1, provides: "The carrier shall not be
liable if he proves that he and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or
that it was impossible for him . . . to take such measures." KREINDLER, supra note 3, at § 11.02.
9. Article 21 of the Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, provides: "If the carrier proves that
the damage was caused by or contributed to by the negligence of the injured person the court may,
in accordance with the provisions of its own law, exonerate the carrier wholly or partly from his
liability." KREINDLER, supra note 3, at § 11.02.
10. Article 25(1) of the Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, provides: "The carrier shall not
be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this convention which exclude or limit his liability,
if the damage is caused by his wilful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance
with the law of the court to which the case is submitted, is considered to be equivalent to wilful
misconduct." KREINDLER, supranote 3, at § 11.041].
11. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 29(1).
12. 78 CONG. REC. 11, 582 (1934). See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 5, at 502 n.18.
13. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
14. For a list of signatories, see KREINDLER, supra note 3, at § 11.01[3].
15. KREINDLER, supra note 3, at § 12.01.
16. Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 (1955) [hereinafter referred to in
text and footnotes as the Hague Protocol]. See generally KREINDLER, supra note 3, at § 12.01.
17. For a list of signatories, see KREINDLER, supra note 3, at § 12.01.
18. See KREINDLER, supra note 3, at § 12.02[1].
19. The translation of the phrase "wilful misconduct" from the French "dol" has been questioned by some translators. See KREINDLER, supra note 3, at § 11.04[l]. This problem was
remedied by the text of the Hague Protocol. Id.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

that damage would probably result . . .," for the ambiguous term
"wilful misconduct" of the original Warsaw Convention.
In spite of the additional terms laid down in the Hague Protocol,
the United States was of the opinion that the limitations of liability
were too low in light of modern conditions and, on November 15, 1965,
the Department of State announced that it would file a formal notice of
denunciation of the Warsaw Convention to take effect six months from
the date of notice. 2 ' This proposed denunciation on the part of the
western world's foremost aircarrier nation promoted intense negotiations among the other signatories. The Montreal Agreement resulted
from those negotiations.2 2 Unlike the other instruments modifying the
Warsaw Convention, the Montreal Agreement was to be signed by the
airlines involved, not by the member nations. By signing the Montreal
Agreement, the international air carriers agreed to an increase in liability to a maximum of $75,000. They further agreed to waive their defenses under article 20(1) of the Warsaw Convention.23 This resulted,
for all practical purposes, in strict liability being imposed on the airlines. However, the defense of contributory negligence of a passenger
was retained.2 4
The member nations once again tried to raise the limitation of liability in 1971.

25
The Guatemala Protocol is the result of that effort.

The Guatemala Protocol raises the limitation of liability to $100,000
and incorporates the strict liability features of the Montreal Agreement.2 6 The Guatemala Protocol reverts to the original scheme of
member nations agreeing to the terms of a new agreement, and the
validity of the new protocol is contingent upon ratification by the
United States. As of the writing of this article, the United States has
not ratified it.27 No official reason has been advanced by the United
20. KREINDLER, supra note 3, at § 12.02[2].
21. Dep't of State Press Release No. 268 (Nov. 15, 1965), 53 Dep't State Bull. 923 (1965). A
denunciation is a formal method of indicating a country's intent to withdraw from an international treaty. The mechanics of denunciation are contained in article 39 of the Convention. See
also KREINDLER, supra note 3, at § 12A.01.
22. Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of Warsaw Convention and Hague Protocol, approved by C.A.B. Order No. E-23680, May 13, 1966; 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966) [hereinafter
referred to in the text as the Montreal Agreement].
23. 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966); Williams v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 442 F. Supp. 455 (E.D. La.
1977).
24. Id.
25. Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, I.C.A.O. Doc. No. 8932 (1971) [hereinafter referred to in text as the
Guatemala Protocol].
26. See Cousins, Warsaw Convention-Air CarrierLiabilityfor PassengerInjuries Sustained
Within a Terminal, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 369, 373 (1976).
27. Id. at 373.
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States in support of its refusal to ratify the Guatemala Protocol, but an
unofficial reason that has been proposed is that the $100,000 limitation
of liability is too low in light of modem conditions.2 8 The American
Trial Lawyers Association has been most vocal in its opposition to the
Guatemala Protocol because of the low limitation of liability.29 It is
also possible that the airlines have put pressure on the government to
hold the line at ever-increasing limitations of liability at the Montreal
Agreement figures.
The Hague Protocol, as well as the Montreal Agreement and the
Guatemala Protocol, modifies the Warsaw Convention in certain respects. These three documents have been adopted by some of the signatories of the Warsaw Convention, but not by all of them. This
means that there are five different standards which govern the liability
of airlines: local law as defined by applicable conflict of law rules in
that flight is not governed by the Warsaw Convention or one of its
successor agreements; the Warsaw Convention as originally drafted; or
the Warsaw Convention as modified by any of the three subsequent
documents. The factors that determine which of the documents govern recovery in the event of an accident are set forth generally in article
1(2) of the Warsaw Convention.3 °
As a result of these four instruments, the potential liability of an
airline engaged in international flight may be limited to $8,300,
$16,600, $75,000, or $100,000. If the flight is between two nonsignatory nations, the liability may be unlimited. The instrument or
instruments that have been ratified by the countries of origin and destination govern the amount of recovery allowable. 3 '

28. Hickey, Breaking the Limit-Liability for Wilful Misconduct Under the Guatemala
Protocol,42 J. AIR L. COM. 603, 604 n.5 (1976).
29. Id. at 604.
30. Article 1(2) provides:
For the purposes of this convention the expression "international transportation"
shall mean any transportation in which, according to the contract made by the parties,
the place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break in the
transportation or a transshipment, are situated either within the territories of two High
Contracting Parties, or within the territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there is
an agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of another power, even though that power is not a party to this convention. Transportation without such an agreed stopping place between territories subject
to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate, or authority of the same High Contracting Party
shall not be deemed to be international for the purposes of this convention.
31. Id.
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THE PROBLEM

Limitations of Liability
The Warsaw Convention and its subsequent instruments specifically limit the damages recoverable from the airlines for injuries sustained as a result of an accident3 2 to at most $100,000. This limitation,
however, does not extend to the airplane manufacturers, maintenance
crews (if held to be independent contractors), or to the government air
traffic controllers or inspectors who certified the airplane as airworthy.3 3 Thus, if the airline is found to be ninety-nine percent negligent
and the manufacturer one percent negligent, the manufacturer would
pay at least $900,000 of a hypothetical $1,000,000 judgment while the
airline would pay at most $100,000. At the worst, under the same hypothetical, if the original Warsaw Convention were to govern recoveries, the manufacturer would be forced to pay $991,700 and the airline
only $8,300. Since the Warsaw Convention supersedes state and federal law in this area, the forum's laws of contribution and indemnification applicable to other tort cases would not govern here as to the
airlines. The limitations of the Warsaw Convention would apply to
the airlines regardless of state or federal law on point.34
These damage limitations present a real and persistent problem for
plaintiffs. There are four areas of attack used by plaintiffs' attorneys:
(1) the constitutional attack; (2) the employee attack; (3) the wilful misconduct exceptions; and (4) the ticketing attack. The latter two have
been successfully used in the United States. The employee attack,
while successful in Canada, has been rejected in the United States.3"
The ConstitutionalAttacks
The Warsaw Convention has been attacked on two constitutional
grounds. The first of these, proposed by John J. Kennelly, is that the
method of adoption required by the convention itself was not adhered
to by the United States and therefore the convention was never properly ratified by the United States.3 6 This is an innovative argument, and
32. All injuries sustained while in flight are not accidents as set forth in the Warsaw Convention. If there was no accident, there can be no recovery. Warshaw v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
442 F. Supp. 400 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
33. Kennelly, Aviation Law InternationalAir Travel-A Brief Diagnosis and Prognosis, 56
Cm. B. REC. 178, 180 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Kennelly].
34. Local law applies as to procedure and substantive law, but limitations of recovery and
defenses available to defendants are governed by the Warsaw Convention. C. RHYNE, AVIATION
ACCIDENT LAW

269-72 (1947).

35. Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977).
36. Mr. Kennelly argued that the method of adoption required by the Convention itself was
not adhered to by the United States and therefore the Convention was never properly ratified by
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one that has a great deal of appeal at first glance. However, the argument has not been adopted by any other writer or by any court of the
United States. The wide acceptance of the Warsaw Convention and
the number of cases upholding its validity, at least by implication, argue against this theory.
The second and more widely accepted constitutional attack on the
Warsaw Convention is a substantive one based on the due process
clause. Plaintiffs, it is argued, are deprived of their right to bring an
action for their total loss by the limitations of the convention. This
argument is based on the proposition that the convention's restriction
of liability constitutes a taking of plaintiffs' property in violation of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments.3 7 In two reported cases, Garcia v. Pan
American Airways38 and Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America v.
Pan American Airways, 39 trial courts summarily rejected the argument
of unconstitutionality, holding that it was not for a trial court to hold
such an important treaty of the United States unconstitutional. In
Garcia, a New York trial court rejected plaintiff's constitutional argument, holding:
The power to declare a law unconstitutional should be exercised
cautiously by a lower Court and avoided, if possible; and unless it
appears clearly, without the slightest doubt, that the law is unconstitutional, it is the better practice for the lower court to assume its constitutionality until the contrary is declared by a Court of Appellate
jurisdiction. This policy is especially desirable where the law is of
great importance and far-reaching effect; or, if the law has been effective for an appreciable period of time.4 °
The rejection of the plaintiffs arguments, on both the constitutional
and public policy grounds, was upheld by the New York Court of Appeals.4 1
In Indemnity Insurance,a U.S. district court rejected a similar constitutional attack. An argument was made that under the due process
the United States. He cites the language of the treaty and the fact that President Johnson unilaterally denounced the Convention in 1965. If the Convention were a binding treaty, Mr. Kennelly
argues, then a two-thirds vote of the Senate would be required to denounce it. Since this Senate
approval was not sought, Mr. Kennelly argues, the Warsaw Convention is not a valid treaty of the
United States and is not binding upon its courts. Kennelly, supra note 33, at 187-88.
37. "No person shall be. . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law...." U.S. CONST. amend. V; "nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
38. 183 Misc. 258, 50 N.Y.S.2d 250 (1944), af'dper curiam, 295 N.Y. 852, 67 N.E.2d 257
(1946).
39. 58 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
40. 183 Misc. 258, 259, 50 N.Y.S.2d 250, 251 (1944).
41. 295 N.Y. 852, 854, 67 N.E.2d 257, 258 (1946).

NOTES AND COMMENTS

clause4 2 the limitations of the Warsaw Convention constituted an impermissible taking of plaintiff's property without due process of law.
The court, analogizing airline cases with workmen's compensation
held that "statutes for the limitation
cases 4 3 and with maritime cases,"
45
of liability are no novelty.
A third case, Pierre v. Eastern Airlines, 6 contains a concise summary of the existing law on the constitutional question raised by various plaintiffs in attempts to circumvent the Warsaw Convention's
limitation of liability. The plaintiff there had argued, in addition to
the deprivation of property argument raised in Garcia and Indemnity
Insurance, that the Warsaw Convention unconstitutionally deprived
him of his right to trial by jury. The court, rejecting this argument as
well, stated:
In many instances, such as the limitation of liability in admiralty
cases. . . and in construction of various State Workmen's Compensation Acts, it has been held that there was violation of neither the
due process clause . . . nor the right to trial by jury . . . of the
Amendments to the Constitution. In all such modifications of legal
practice, it would seem, analogically at least, that the assessment of
47
damages is not to be considered an exclusive function of the jury.
An argument based on the unconstitutionality of the Warsaw Convention was accepted in only one case, but the decision was subsequently withdrawn by the trial judge. In Burdell v. Canadian Pac4'ic
Airlines, Ltd 4 8 Mr. Kennelly, representing the plaintiff, persuaded
Judge Nicholas J. Bua, then of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, that the damage limitation contained in the Warsaw Convention
was unconstitutional. Judge Bua looked to a leading case in admiralty
law, Moragne v. States Marine Lines,49 and held that the reasoning
there was analogous to Burdell. Moragne invalidated a statute, not a
treaty, on the limitations of liability issue. Judge Bua later withdrew
his decision on the constitutional question when the case was settled
between the parties.5 0 This somewhat vague precedent is relied upon by
Mr. Kennelly when he states: "The holdings in Moragne. . . eradicate
42. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
43. Specifically, the state of Washington's workmen's compensation statute, WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 51.04.010---51.98.050 (1972).
44. Vessel Limitation of Liability Statute, 46 U.S.C.. § 183 (1970).
45. 58 F. Supp. 338, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
46. 152 F. Supp. 486 (D.N.J. 1957).
47. Id. at 488.
48. 10 Av. Cas. 18,151 (1st opinion); 11 Av. Cas. 17,351 (2nd opinion). See Kennelly, supra
note 33, at 196 n.29.
49. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
50. 11 Av. Cas. 17,351. See Kennelly, supra note 33, at 196 n.29.
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any constitutional basis for any statute or treaty which would deny a
fair recovery for the wrongful killing of a human being."'"
The constitutional argument must fail in light of the overwhelming
precedents in favor of the validity of international treaties. 2 The only
qualification is that such a treaty must be made "under the Authority of
the United States."5 3 This long trend of upholding the treaty-making
powers of the executive and legislative branches of government has
been said to rest upon the separation of powers doctrine 54 or upon the
political question doctrine. 5 Wherever its theoretical base rests, the
Warsaw Convention fits squarely within the type of cases decided by
the Court and is subject to the rule that treaties of the United States
have never been held unconstitutional. 6 In addition, the courts have
continuously upheld limitations of liability in state workmen's compensation cases and in federal maritime cases. This, added to the strong,
almost irrebuttable, presumption of validity of treaties, argues against
the chances of the Warsaw Convention being declared unconstitutional.
The Employee Atack
Several plaintiffs' attorneys have attempted to circumvent the limitations of liability set forth in the Warsaw Convention by seeking recovery directly from the employees of the airline for their own
negligence. They have argued that the Warsaw Convention applies
only to the airlines themselves, and does not extend to its employees.
This method of attack has not been universally successful.5 7
In dictum of a Canadian case, Stratton v. Trans-CanadaAirlines,5 8
the court stated that "[tihere is nothing in the Act5 9 that even remotely
suggests that the word 'carrier' is to be interpreted as including employees of carriers. "60 The Court of Appeal found that the Warsaw
51. Kennelly, supra note 33, at 190.
52. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304 (1936); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890).
53. U.S. CONST. art. 6, cl. 2.
54. Haskell, The Warsaw System and the U.S Constitution Revisited, 39 J. AIR L. CoM. 483,
493-97 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Haskell].
55. Id. at 497-505.
56. Id. at 493.
57.

See, e.g., Comments, Carriage by Air Act, 1952-Limitation of Air Carrier's Liabil-

ity--Whether Servants of Carrier Also Protected, 41 CAN. B. REV. 124 (1963).
58. 27 D.L.R. 2d 670, 34 W.W.R. 183 (B.C.S.C. 1961), arfd in part, 32 D.L.R. 2d 736, 37
W.W.R. 577 (B.C.C.A. 1962).
59. The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage
by Air, CAN. REv. STAT., ch. 45 (1952). The Carriage by Air Act of 1952 is Canada's implementation of the Warsaw Convention.
60. 27 D.L.R. 2d 670, 674, 34 W.W.R. 183, 187 (B.C.S.C. 1961).
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Convention did not apply to the facts of the case, so the court neither
affirmed nor overruled the trial court's analysis of the Act. 6' Supporters
of this view cite the language of the convention in that articles 17 (carrier liability for personal injuries, etc.), 18 (carrier liability for checked
baggage, etc.), 19 (carrier liability for transportation delay), and 22
(maximum liability of the carrier) speak only of the carrier while articles 25 (exception of maximum liability for acts of wilful misconduct)
and 20 (general exceptions to carrier liability) specifically include employees as well as carriers.6 2 The proponents of this argument say that
this duality of language means that the treaty does not extend maximum liability limitations to the employees of the carriers and that recovery may be had from these employees beyond the limits set forth in
article 22.63
In Herd & Co. v. Krawill," a case in many ways similar to
Stratton, the United States Supreme Court held that the limitations
contained in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act did not apply to the
employees of the carrier.6 5 This case, read together with the Canadian
cases, would seem to be strongly persuasive of the argument that employees of the carrier are not protected by the liability limitations of
article 22.
The appellate courts of the United States, however, have not
adopted the maritime law-aviation law analogy of the Canadian cases.
This analogy, although adopted at the trial court level, was expressly
rejected by the Second Circuit in a 1977 case, Reed v. Wiser.6 6 There,
plaintiffs were the representatives of nine passengers killed when a
bomb exploded aboard their airliner. While admitting that the Warsaw Convention limited the airline's liability, the plaintiffs sought full
recovery from the president of the airline and the vice-president in
charge of airline security, alleging that their negligence allowed a bomb
to be placed aboard the aircraft, thus causing plaintiffs' loss.
The court in Reed examined over thirty cases on point, both foreign and domestic, as well as leading articles on the subject. It included
in its examination the Canadian case cited above. The court held that
the employees of the airline were clearly within the limitations of liability set forth in the convention, stating: "[A] construction of the lan61. 37 D.L.R. 2d 736, 37 W.W.R. 577 (B.C.C.A. 1962).
62. See Comments, Carriage by Air Act, 1952-Limitation of Air Carrier's Liabilit- Whether Servants of CarrierAlso Protected,41 CAN. B. REV. 124, 127-28 (1963).
63. Id. at 128.
64. 359 U.S. 297 (1959).
65. Id. at 308.
66. 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977).
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guage of Article 22(1) and Article 24 which extends the Convention's
liability limitation to passenger claims against employees not only reflects the plain meaning and purpose of the French [official] text of
these articles but accomplishes all of the Convention's objectives."6 7
Rejecting an analogy to Krawill,the court summarily dismissed all policy considerations. Recognizing that the convention had been subject
to extensive consideration and modification by the executive and legislative branches over its short history, the court concluded: "Our duty is
to enforce the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States,
whatever they might be, and until one of our sister branches declares
otherwise, the Warsaw Convention remains the supreme law of the
land."6 The court cited its earlier decision in Smith v. CanadianPacific
Airways, Ltd6 9 in support of that part of its decision that held "the
Warsaw Convention remains the supreme law of the land,"7 and that
the Warsaw Convention governed the recovery in this case.7 '
Reed is the leading case on point in the United States today, the
precise issue never having been decided by the Supreme Court. It
clearly and unequivocally stands for the proposition that employees of
a carrier engaged in international air travel may not be liable in negligence for damages in excess of the limitations of liability set forth in
article 22 as modified by subsequent instruments. If one of the employees involved in the accident were to be found guilty of wilful misconduct, article 25 provides that the limitations of liability of article 22
are inapplicable. If the employee were to be found not guilty of wilful
misconduct, there is no justifiable policy reason to hold that employee
responsible for payment of all such damages over the admittedly low
limitations of the Warsaw Convention. To do so would mean that it
would be practically impossible to employ or to insure such people.
The Wilful Misconduct Exception
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention provides a presumption of
liability of the carrier for any injury sustained by a passenger, whatever
the cause.72 The limits of the convention apply to such an injury unless,
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 1092.
Id. at 1093.
452 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1971).
555 F.2d at 1093.
Id.
Article 17 provides:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger. . . if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place
on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.
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by the terms of article 25, the carrier's actions towards the passenger
73
can be categorized by the court as constituting "wilful misconduct.
This wilful misconduct provision has been most successful in
avoiding the limitations of the convention. The leading case, Froman
v. Pan American Airways,7 4 defines wilful misconduct as more than
gross negligence. To be outside the limitations of the Warsaw Convention, the conduct of the carrier must be such that "in addition to
doing the act in question, the actor must have intended the result that
came about or must have launched on such a line of conduct with
knowledge of what the consequences probably would be and had gone
ahead recklessly despite his knowledge of these conditions. '75 Another
court has defined the phrase to mean "the intentional performance of
of the probable
an act in such a manner as to imply reckless disregard
76
consequences of the performance of the act.

1

Although the term "reckless" constantly reappears in the courts'
attempts to deal with this exception, the definition remains far from
fixed and concrete. It must be constantly readjusted to fit the facts of
each particular case, and an examination of the facts that have been
held to be wilful misconduct is most instructive. Thus, the failure of a
pilot to follow air traffic control instructions has been held to be wilful
misconduct, but negligent misinterpretation of such instructions would
not be.77 It does not require "a deliberate intention to wreck the airplane,"7 " but it may be as little as "a minor lapse from the accepted
standards of safety."7 9 It is an objective test, since the pilot will rarely
be available for cross-examination as to his subjective intent.8 0
It should be noted that article 25(1) of the Warsaw Convention
provides for a local definition of the term "wilful misconduct."8 "
Therefore, a uniform result is not required by the treaty from nation to
nation, nor even among the various jurisdictions within the United
States.8 2
73. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 25.
74. 284 A.D. 935, 135 N.Y.S.2d 619 (1954), leave to appeal denied, 308 N.Y. 1050 (1955),
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1955). See KREINDLER, supra note 3, at § 11.0411].
75. Record on Appeal at 452-55. Froman v. Pan American Airways, 284 A.D. 935, 135
N.Y.S.2d 619 (1954); KREINDLER, supra note 3, at § 11.04[1].
76. Charge to the Jury, Berner v. United Airlines, S.D.N.Y. civ. 142-201 (cited in KREINDLER, supra note 3, at § 11.0411]).
77. See generally KREINDLER, supra note 3, at § 11.04[1].

78. Berner v. United Airlines, S.D.N.Y. civ. 142-201 (cited in
11.04[1]).
79. Id.

80. KREINDLER, supra note 3, at § 11.0411].
81. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 25(1).
82. Id.

KREINDLER,

supra note 3, at §
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Perhaps the best definition of the term comes from the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in KLM Royal Dutch Airline v.
Tuller.8 3 The appellate court quoted with approval from the lower
court's jury instructions as to the definition of wilful misconduct:
"[wlilful misconduct is the intentional performance of an act with
knowledge that the. . . act will probably result in injury or damage, or
in some manner as to imply reckless disregard of the consequences of
its performance; and likewise, it also means. . . failure to act. . *"84
This test is a flexible one, malleable to fit the facts of the case at bar.
As such, it is the most susceptible of creative work by plaintiffs' attorneys and provides the greatest latitude to avoid the limitations of liability embodied in the Warsaw Convention.
The Ticketing Attack
One of the more recent areas of attack upon the Warsaw Convention's applicability has been in the area of ticketing. 85 Article 3 of the
convention states that a ticket must be given to each passenger.8 6 The
ticket must contain, among other things, "a statement that the transportation is subject to the rules relating to liability established by this convention."8 7 The burden of proving delivery to the passenger is placed
on the airlines.88 Thus, the delivery of "boarding passes" to the passengers of a charter flight has been held not to be in compliance with article 3(2) making inapplicable the limitations of liability of the
convention.8 9 In a similar case, the New York appellate court reached
the opposite result.90 In the Froman case, one of the issues raised was
whether Miss Froman had received a ticket as required by the convention. She was on a U.S.O. trip to entertain United States servicemen in
Europe when her plane crashed. She saw the ticket placed on the table
in front of her, but did not actually take possession of it. An employee
of the tour in charge of transportation took possession of it. The court
found that by seeing the ticket and then boarding the airplane, Miss
Froman had impliedly consented to the contract of carriage as printed
on the ticket and thus was within the provisions of the Warsaw Con83. 292 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961).
84. Id. at 778.
85. Address by John J. Kennelly, Loyola University, October 18, 1977.
86. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 3(1).
87. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 3(l)(e).
88. DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 433 F. Supp. 1047 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
89. Address by John J. Kennelly, Loyola University, October 18, 1977.
90. Froman v. Pan American Airways, 284 A.D. 935, 135 N.Y.S. 619 (1954), leave to appeal
denied, 308 N.Y. 1050 (1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1955). See KREINDLER, supra note 3, at
§ 11.05[2).
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vention. 9 '
Mistakes on the face of the ticket or an improperly drawn ticket
will not nullify the convention's applicability. 92 But the requirement of
article 3(l)(e) that the ticket must contain "[a] statement that the transportation is subject to the rules relating to liability established by this
convention' 9 3 must be satisfied. Where the ticket's alleged compliance
with this requirement began with a sentence several hundred words in
length, the court held such a warning ineffective and not in compliance
with article 3(1)(e). 94 It did not hurt the plaintiff's case to draw a judge
who wore bifocals and who was unable to read the small printing of the
ticket.9 5 He ruled that the case was not covered by the limitations of
liability set forth in the convention.96 Unintelligibility of the warning
has been held to void the effectiveness of any such warning and to expose the carrier to full liability.9 7
This area of attack has been narrowed considerably by the Montreal Agreement, in which the signatory airlines agreed upon a uniform
ticket warning that purports to obviate the problems set forth in this
section.98 This area of attack remains open, however, and each case
should be examined for both receipt of a ticket containing a warning
and for the effectiveness of that warning upon the average passenger.
IN

SUPPORT OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM

The proponents of the Warsaw Convention set forth four arguments in favor of universal application of the treaty to international
airline injury cases. 99 These are, briefly, that the convention keeps the
cost of airline travel reasonably low by decreasing insurance costs for
the carriers, the uniform rules promulgated by the convention encourage foreign travel, the presumption of fault under the Warsaw
Convention and the Montreal Agreement streamlines court procedures,
and the convention really does nothing more for the airlines than has
91. Id.
92. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1,at art. 3(2).
93. Warsaw Convention, supra note i, at art. 3.
94. Lisi v. Alitalia-Line Aeree Italiane, 253 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y.), affd 370 F.2d 508 (2d
Cir. 1966), aff'd by equally divided Court, 390 U.S. 455 (1968).
95. The trial judge found the warning to be in "microscopic type," "camouflaged in Liliputian print," "unnoticeable and unreadable." He went on to state that "It]hey are ineffectively positioned, diminutively sized, and unemphasized by bold face type, contrasting colors, or anything
else. The simple truth is that they are so artfully camouflaged that their presence is concealed."
253 F. Supp. at 243. See also Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965).
96. 253 F. Supp. at 243.
97. KREINDLER, supra note 3, at § 11.05[2].
98. C.A.B. Order No. E-23680, May 13, 1966; 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966).
99. See generally Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 5.
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been done for other industries in maritime law and in state workmen's
compensation acts.
The first of these arguments, that the airlines are in need of protection from monumental liability claims in order to function, has been
cited as one of the initial reasons for the convention's adoption in
1929. t° The costs of insurance coverage, or of self-insurance, should
the limitations of the convention be discarded, they argue, would be
prohibitive. These costs would raise the cost of air travel beyond the
reach of most people, and, thus, further raise the cost to those few who
could still afford it. Those who wish greater coverage than that provided by the convention, they argue, can purchase additional insurance
on their own. Low costs to the airlines would mean low costs to the
passengers, and thus more people would be able to travel by air. This
would, argue the proponents of the convention, further lower the costs
of air travel by spreading the fixed costs over more passengers.
These arguments are purely economic. As such, they are persuasive only to the extent they remain economic. When used to justify an
exclusion or limitation of liability in a legal or policy sense, they lose
much of their appeal. Every commercial venture that sells a product
or provides a service must bear the cost of insurance for the benefit of
the public. That is as much of a cost of doing business as rent or salaries. No other business enjoys the liability limitations of the Warsaw
Convention. Airplane manufacturers have managed to thrive without
the benefit of this limitation, in spite of some enormous judgments
against them in recent years.' There is no sound policy reason to include the airlines within the liability umbrella of the Warsaw Convention in light of this ability of the manufacturers to exist without that
coverage.
The second argument is that a unified system is needed to promote
international travel by air and the exchange of airline passengers
among the signatory nations. This is an admittedly laudable purpose,
but it ignores the fact that the treaty specifically provides for the use of
local rules of procedure in Warsaw Convention cases and that it is a
local definition that will determine the negligence and wilful misconduct provisions of the treaty."0 2 The only uniform provision of the
treaty that relates to this discussion is the limitation provision. And
even that "uniform" provision is not uniform among all the nations
100. Id.
101. Address by John J. Kennelly, Loyola University, October 18, 1977. Judgments in domestic aircraft cases have reached over $5,000,000 for a single injury.
102. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at arts. 21, 25(1), 28(2).
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that have signed one or more of the four instruments governing international air travel. That, standing alone, cannot support an argument
that uniformity is achieved by the treaty. The dissimilarities in local
rules of procedure and tort law, in addition to the varying recovery
limits, clearly undercut the uniformity justification of the convention.
Further, most foreign flag carriers engaged in international air
travel are owned by the governments whose flags they fly. Many
foreign flag airlines are operated at a loss in order to promote the prestige of that country. A perfect example of this is the enormous losses
being incurred by the flights of the Anglo-French Concorde. 10 3 This
joint venture between the French and British government-owned aerospace industries is being flown by Air France and British Airways, each
owned by their respective governments. These planes would be flown
in international air travel regardless of the costs involved, mainly to
justify the government's enormous capital outlay in developing the
planes and to enhance the national prestige of the respective nations.
These same factors, albeit to a lesser degree, influence the establishment of most foreign flag airlines. The effect on such operations of a
rise in the liability limits, or even an abolition of such limits, would be
small or nonexistent. There can be no logical justification to hold
down insurance or liability costs or to promote more international air
travel when the owners of the airlines in question are foreign governments.
The third argument is that absent the Warsaw Convention, the issue of fault would have to be litigated in every case. With the presumption of fault inherent in the Warsaw Convention" and in the
Montreal Agreement,"°5 this often lengthy and difficult factor is taken
out of trials and the plaintiff is, therefore, afforded a speedier recovery.
While attractive in theory, most aviation accidents are clear as to fault,
at least as far as the absence of passenger fault is concerned. The days
of airplanes falling out of the sky without fault are long over. Travel
by air is by far the safest mode of mass transportation. ° 6 Absent a
passenger placing a bomb aboard the aircraft and then boarding that
aircraft, the liability for aviation accidents will probably rest upon the
airline, the manufacturer, the maintainer of that airliner, or the federally-operated air traffic control system. The fault may be spread
among some or all of these parties, and the presumption of liability of
103. See generally JEPPESEN/SANDERSON, AVIATION YEARBOOK 188-210 (1977).
104. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 17.
105. C.A.B. Order No. E-23680, May 13, 1966; 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966).
106. A.O.P.A. HANDBOOK FOR PILOTS (1977).
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the Warsaw Convention covers only the carrier. Thus, the determination of liability for an aviation accident is usually far from settled. The
passenger surrenders his right to recover in excess of a set limit in exchange for an illusory presumption of liability in order to speed his
recovery. The argument that the passenger is exchanging a presumption of liability on the one hand for a lower limitation of recoverable
damages on the other would seem to be a contract devoid of consideration as far as the plaintiff is concerned.
The most telling arguments brought forth in favor of retaining the
liability limits of the Warsaw Convention are the legal ones: e.g., the
constitutional arguments and the use of analogies to maritime law and
to state workmen's compensation acts. The constitutional issues have
07
already been adequately dealt with for the purposes of this article.
The maritime law and compensation act cases are persuasive, but not
controlling. Those cases, it must be remembered, deal with state and
federal statutes, not treaties of the United States. It is far easier for a
court to review the substantive provisions of such a statute for constitutionality than for that court to hold a treaty of the United States unconstitutional. No such treaty has yet been held invalid.'0 8
The various state workmen's compensation acts and wrongful
death acts are persuasive of the policy favoring an exchange of a new
cause of action or a presumption of liability for a set limit of recoveries
for damages suffered. To further advance this last argument, however,
the proponents should put forth something of greater value to the
plaintiffs than what is currently embodied in the Warsaw Convention.
The higher limits of the Guatemala Protocol are a step in this direction,
but a lessening of the wilful misconduct exception to a gross negligence
standard, for example, would go a long way towards quieting the critics
of the treaty.
These legal arguments are, charitably phrased, circular. They say,
in effect: the treaty is constitutional because it is a valid treaty, and the
treaty is valid because it is constitutional. The very real objections,
both legal and nonlegal, are drowned in a sea of illogical whirlpools.
Many highly competent attorneys have attempted a frontal attack upon
the treaty in the courts. All legal arguments have failed. All that is left
is the method that worked in 1965. The government must feel compelled to renounce the treaty and to seek a new protocol that is more
evenly matched between the competing interests of plaintiffs and the
airlines.
107. See text accompanying notes 36-56 supra.
108. HaskeU, supra note 54.
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ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE WARSAW CONVENTION'S LIABILITY

LIMITS

The exclusion of other potential defendants, along with the multiple liability limits, are the strongest arguments against the liability limitations of the Warsaw Convention. The protection afforded the
carriers is not extended to the manufacturers of airliners,' 0 9 the people
who maintain that airliner" 0 (if such persons are held to be independent contractors and not employees of the airline), air traffic controllers,"' or the inspectors who certify the airplane airworthy."' 2
Nonetheless, this is a technical distinction for most signatory nations,
since all of the above functions are usually performed by the government. In the United States, however, private companies handle all aspects of civil 3aviation except air traffic control and some airworthiness
inspections."
There is no compelling reason for the airlines to enjoy a limitation
of liability to a maximum of $100,000 while the manufacturers and/or
maintainers should be liable for millions. The finances of the major airframe manufacturers are certainly no more inherently stable than those
of the airlines."I4 If the argument that the passenger is exchanging certain liability for a decreased recovery is valid, there can be no rationale
that would justify a refusal to extend these dual provisions to the manufacturer and/or the maintainer.
The problem of multiple liability limits argument is best posited
by the use of a hypothetical aviation accident." 5 On a Chicago to New
York flight, A is leaving at New York; B is continuing on to London
where his trip ends; C is continuing on to Rome from London; and D is
finally stopping in Iran. If the plane were to crash between Chicago
and New York, A would not be covered by the Warsaw Convention's
limitations of liability because he is a domestic passenger. B, C, and D
are possibly covered by the convention because they were travelling to
another nation. This would be true even if they were to change airplanes or even airlines in New York. B, the London passenger, would
109.
110.
111.
112.

KREINDLER, supra note 3, at § 11.05[7].
Id.
Id.
Id.

113.

See FEDERAL AVIATION REGULATIONS FOR PILOTS §§ 91.169, .217 (1974).

114. Witness the continuing Lockheed Aircraft story and the disappearance of the wellknown aviation names into conglomerates such as United Technologies and North AmericanRockwell. Even where manufacturers can avoid absorption, they must combine to survive, i.e.,
McDonnell-Douglas.
115. This example is borrowed, with thanks, from Mr. Kennelly's article. See Kennelly,
supra note 33, at 176-78.
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be limited to a $75,000 recovery by the Montreal Agreement signed by
the British airlines. C, the Rome passenger, would be limited to $16,600
by the Hague Protocol, the last instrument signed by the Italian Government. D, the Iran passenger, would not be limited by any of these
instruments since Iran never signed the Warsaw Convention or its subsequent instruments. There can be no justification for these wide disparities in recoveries based on the same incident.
CONCLUSION

No matter how persuasive the political and policy arguments
seem, no matter how incongruous and unfair the present treaty might
seem, it is clear that all courts that have been called upon to decide the
question have found the Warsaw Convention constitutional. The best
efforts of plaintiffs who seek to avoid the low restrictions on liability of
the convention seem to be directed towards invoking one of the three
recognized methods of circumventing the treaty: the wilful misconduct
exception, the ticketing/valid warning exception, and the employee/employer exception.
There is a strong and influential cry being raised among aviation
lawyers for a modification or renunciation of the Warsaw Convention,
either politically or judicially. An increasing number of articles have
appeared in recent years in opposition to the low limits of the convention. The rising recoveries in related tort and products liability cases
have encouraged these attorneys to seek higher recoveries in airline accident cases. As of this date, these eloquent cries have fallen upon deaf
ears in all three branches of government.
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